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THE NEW BANKING LEGISLATION IN RUSSIA:
THEORETICAL ADEQUACY, PRACTICAL
DIFFICULTIES, AND POTENTIAL
SOLUTIONS
INNA VYSMAN
INTRODUCTION
A key element to the successful realization of economic perestroika
(restructuring) in a former socialistic state such as Russia is an effective
financial system. The main step in achieving this goal is the creation of a
well-fimctioning two-tier competitive banking system wherein a central
bank focuses on regulating overall credit and interest rates, while newly
established commercial banks assume the responsibility of deposit and
loan transactions with businesses and households.' Russia attempted to
create such a banking system through the introduction of new banking
legislation in 1990. Due to the difficulties of the present economic and
political situation in Russia, however, even a well-written law does not
ensure a productive and efficient system.
This Note explores in detail the new Russian banking legislation and
its impact upon the Russian economy. Part I examines the adequacy of
these new banking laws in creating, in theory, a foundation for an effi-
cient banking system. Part II outlines the practical challenges that face
the new banking legislation. Part III offers possible solutions to these
problems. This Note concludes that Russia must put into practice the
proffered solutions to the problems encountered with the practical appli-
cation of the new banking laws if it is to achieve a banking system capa-
ble of sustaining steady economic growth.
I. THE THEORETICAL ADEQUACY OF THE
NEW RUSSIAN BANKING LEGISLATION
Creation of a new legal banking framework is the most important task
in creating a well-functioning competitive banking system in Russia. The
legal foundation of the old Soviet banking system was traditionally very
weak. The former Soviet regime did not restrict itself by legal rules and
used banks for its own political purposes.2 The introduction of the Cen-
tral Bank Law3 and the new Commercial Banking Law4 (collectively the
1. See V. Sundararajan, Central Banking Reforms in Formerly Planned Economies,
Fin. & Dev., Mar. 1992, at 10, 11. Russia has only a national banking system, unlike the
United States, which has a co-existent national and state banking system.
2. See Andrei I. Kazmin, The Contours of a New Banking System in the Dissolving
Soviet Union, Bank Archive, No. 2, 1992, at 113, 114.
3. On the Central Bank of the RSFSR (Bank of Russia) (1990) (Committee on For-
eign and Comparative Laws, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, trans., 1990) (on
file at Fordhamn Law Review) [hereinafter Central Bank Law].
4. On Banks and Banking in the RSFSR (1990) (Committee on Foreign and Corn-
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"laws" or the "new legislation") on December 2, 1990, marked the be-
ginning' of Russia's market-based financial system. These laws created a
two-tier banking system by separating the Central Bank's operations
from commercial banking functions. The new legislation has two objec-
tives: (i) to establish a genuinely independent central bank; and (ii) to
provide this central bank with the means both to supervise and regulate
newly created commercial banks and to conduct monetary and credit
policy.
A. Establishment of an Independent Central Bank
The proclaimed independence of the Central Bank of Russia6 is one of
the principal features of the new legislation. The laws hold the Bank of
Russia accountable to the Russian Supreme Soviet,7 but independent of
the executive and administrative bodies of the Russian government.'
This provision, though comparatively less drastic than Germany's
Bundesbank Act,9 for example, is a major innovation for Russia. The
Central Bank has become independent from the executive government's
control for the first time since the establishment of a state bank 130 years
ago. 10
Prior to the enactment of the new banking legislation, existent laws
defined the Gosbank" as a "subordinate body" of the government. The
Minister of Finance had the power to give directives to the Gosbank's
Chairman of the Board on behalf of the government. 12 Furthermore, the
old rules prescribed the selection of the Chairman of the Board of the
Gosbank from among the former vice-ministers of finance. 13
To ensure the independence of the Central Bank and to do away with
the old order, the new legislation requires the Supreme Soviet, not the
executive branch, to nominate the Central Bank's Chairman of the Board
of Directors. 4 This nomination is for a term of five years,"5 while the
parative Laws, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, trans., 1990) (on file at Ford-
ham Law Review) [hereinafter Commercial Banking Law].
5. There were no legislative acts of such kind throughout the whole Soviet history.
See Kazmin, supra note 2, at 114.
6. This Note shall refer to the Central Bank of Russia as the Bank of Russia or the
Central Bank.
7. The Supreme Soviet is the legislative body of the Russian government. See 2 The
Europa World Year Book 1992, at 2811 (1992).
8. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. I.
9. The Bundesbank Act gives Germany's central bank (The Federal Bank) complete
autonomy. "The Bank is neither subject to the constitutional powers of direction of the
Federal Chancellor nor to supervision by the Federal Government or any member
thereof nor to Parliamentary control." Business Transactions in Germany (FRG)
§ 39.02[4] (Bernd Ruster ed., 1992).
10. See Kazmin, supra note 2, at 114.
11. The Gosbank performed the functions of a central bank in the former Soviet
Union.
12. See Kazmin, supra note 2, at 114.
13. See id.
14. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art 37.
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parliament and the President of Russia are elected for four years. 6 In-
deed, the exclusive rights of the Supreme Soviet to appoint and to dismiss
the Chairman of the Board of Directors1 7 have already safeguarded the
top bankers during and after the August 1991 coup. When the provi-
sional government dismissed the Chairman of the Central Bank as part
of the coup, the action was rapidly acknowledged to be illegal; shortly
thereafter, the Chairman returned to his duties."
For the first time, the laws distinctly define the functions of the Central
Bank as the fiscal agent of the government.19 Before 1991, the Central
Bank frequently financed the budget deficit through direct loans to the
Ministry of Finance. These loans were given "without any kind of collat-
eral, at zero-interest rates and with unlimited period of repayment."20 In
contrast, the new legislation establishes a maximum allowable debt limit
for the Ministry of Finance.21 Moreover, the laws mandate that the
Bank of Russia extend loans to the Ministry only on general terms, the
same as for all other borrowers, thereby removing all of the Ministry's
former privileges in obtaining credit.' Such loans may be extended for a
maximum of six months23 and require appropriate collateral, such as
state bonds, promissory notes, and other securities.24
In an effort to prevent the traditional Soviet government practice of
financing budget deficits by printing money and appropriating savings
from the state banking system, the laws expressly prohibit the emission
of money for the purpose of directly financing Russia's deficit.' Fur-
thermore, the Central Bank must draw up an annual directive on money
supply for the Supreme Soviet's approval.26 Through these require-
ments, then, the laws create, at least in theory, a truly independent Bank
of Russia.
B. Organization, Regulation, and Supervision of the Commercial
Banks in Russia under the New Banking Laws
Although the foregoing measures are very important, they alone can-
not ensure the Central Bank's actual independence. In order to safe-
guard its newly acquired status, the Bank of Russia must promote an
independent monetary and credit policy. Such a policy had been impos-
15. See id.
16. See Kazmin, supra note 2, at 114.
17. The Supreme Soviet may dismiss the Chairman of the Board of Directors only in
the event of retirement, serious illness, or inability to execute his duties. See id. at 114-15.
18. See id
19. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 17.
20. Kazmin, supra note 2, at 115.
21. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 17.
22. See id
23. See id
24. See id
25. See id art. 11.
26. See id. art. 13.
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sible to implement under the prior relationships between the Central
Bank and commercial banks. "The whole banking framework has to be
replaced by a new one, where traditional administrative pressure on
banks would be replaced by the skilled regulation of the banking busi-
ness, based on world-wide accepted methods and instruments. '27 In an
effort to create such "skilled regulation," the laws deal extensively with
the relationship between the Bank of Russia and commercial banks.
1. The Organization of a Commercial Bank under the New
Legislation
Under the new legislation, a commercial bank may operate only in
accordance with an appropriate license issued by the Central Bank,
which lists the services that a bank may perform.28 This provision is in
accordance with Western practice, particularly Swiss banking law.29
The laws provide for a relatively simple application process. The Bank
of Russia processes applications for bank licenses and must act on them
within three months of receipt of all the necessary documents. 30 Foun-
ders of a commercial bank must furnish the Central Bank with a license
application, constituent documents, an economic substantiation, and per-
sonal data about the bank's management.31
For the first time, anyone, including foreigners, may set up a commer-
cial bank. To create a foreign bank, 32 the following additional docu-
ments must be submitted:
[(1)] a resolution by the relevant authority of the foreign founder (part-
ner) on participation in the establishment of a bank within [Russia] or
on the opening of a subsidiary; [(2)] the statutes or some other docu-
ment confirming the status of the legal entity and its published balance
sheets for the past three years; [and (3)] a written approval issued by a
supervisory authority of the home country of the founder (partner)
regarding participation in the establishment of a bank within [Russia]
or the opening of a subsidiary. 33
27. Kazmin, supra note 2, at 115.
28. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 23; Commercial Banking Law, supra
note 4, art. 11.
29. See Peter Nobel, Rules of Conduct for Swiss Banks, in Trends and Forces in Inter-
national Banking Law 83, 87 (Boston University ed., 1990).
30. See Commercial Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 16.
31. See id. art. 12. The concept "constituent documents" includes "articles of incor-
poration, the bank's statutes, resolution of the approval of the statutes and designation of
the bank's administrative bodies." Id. "Economic substantiation" means "the statement
of an independent auditing firm assuring the solvency of the members of the bank's char-
ter .. " Kazmin, supra note 2, at 116. "Personal data about the bank's management"
means "the confirmation of professional skills of the members of the board of directors of
the new bank." Id.
32. The concept of a "foreign bank" includes "a bank with the involvement of Soviet
and foreign capital, a foreign bank, or a subsidiary of a non-resident bank." Commercial
Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 13.
33. Id.
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The Central Bank requires license applicants to provide these docu-
ments in order to ensure: (1) that the bank's articles of incorporation
and statutes do not violate any Russian laws; and (2) that the bank's
founders have adequate financial standing.34 The Bank of Russia may
refuse to grant a banking license if one or both of these requirements are
not satisfied.35
Russia appears ready to open its financial markets to the rest of the
world. The new laws do not restrict foreign ownership of banks in any
way other than the Central Bank's right to establish additional require-
ments regarding the minimum and maximum amount of required statu-
tory capital.3 6
The laws require that the funds of at least three founders of a bank,
regardless of whether they are individuals or corporate entities, form the
statutory capital of a bank.37 Read expansively, this provision would al-
low money to flow from the state budget, political groups, or public char-
ity funds into the starting capital of a newly founded bank, thus
undermining the declared independence of banks from government. 38 To
guard against this risk, the laws expressly prohibit the use of these finan-
cial sources in the establishment of a bank's capital.39 Furthermore, to
ensure a commercial bank's newly-acquired political independence, the
laws prohibit government and state officials from working as part of a
bank's management.'
In addition to issuing general banking licenses, the Bank of Russia
may issue special licenses that allow commercial banks to carry out for-
eign exchange transactions.4" The Central Bank also has the right to
withdraw a banking license when a commercial bank: (1) provides false
information; (2) fails to commence activities within one year following
the issuance of the license; (3) conducts operations not authorized by the
license; (4) otherwise breaches a trust as stipulated by the law; (5)
breaches anti-monopoly regulations; or (6) declares bankruptcy.42
Thus, in theory at least, the new legislation provides the Central Bank
with sufficient power to ensure that commercial banks are organized in
accordance with the new legislation and the laws of the Russian
Federation.
2. Regulation and Supervision of a Commercial Bank
The new legislation defines the principles governing the Bank of Rus-
34. See id art. 17.
35. See iL
36. See id art. 14.
37. See id art. 10.
38. See Kazmin, supra note 2, at 116.
39. See Commercial Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 10.
40. See id art. 8.
41. See id art. 35; Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 21.
42. See Commercial Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 18.
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sia's relations with commercial banks. The laws require the Central
Bank to promote the creation of favorable conditions for stable perform-
ances by banks but prohibit the Bank of Russia from interfering in banks'
daily operations. 3 The independence from such interference greatly
contrasts with Russia's prior tradition of regulating every aspect of
banks' activities. The new legislation also maintains that "the Bank of
Russia shall ... exercise regulatory functions with regard to and supervi-
sion of banks with the aim of maintaining stability of [the] monetary and
loan system."'
Moreover, the laws now provide for equality of legal rights between
resident and non-resident banks, which the Bank of Russia must en-
sure. 5 This provision is rather controversial in light of the different ap-
proaches to this issue taken by Western banking laws: some countries
have similar provisions, while others heavily restrict activities by foreign
banks."
Similar to the existing banking regulations of many developed coun-
tries,47 the Russian banking laws prescribe certain financial norms which
have to be fulfilled by every commercial bank.48 The norms include: (1)
a minimum statutory capital requirement; (2) a maximum equity ratio
with due assessment of risks; (3) liquidity rates; (4) a minimum amount
of statutory reserves to be deposited with the Bank of Russia; (5) maxi-
mum risks allowable for one borrower; (6) limitations of hard currency
and exchange rate risks; and (7) restrictions on the use of borrowed de-
posits for the purchase of shares belonging to legal persons.49
The laws also provide, if Russia's economic situation so requires, that
"[t]he Supreme Soviet... upon representation by the Bank of Russia,
may establish other economic norms and rates .... ,"o This provision
gives the Bank of Russia flexibility to conform its regulations to Russia's
rapidly changing economic conditions.
In order to ensure compliance by commercial banks with these finan-
cial norms and other Russian laws, the new legislation provides a legal
framework for the supervision of the banks by the Bank of Russia. Many
other countries give their central banks the power to supervise the bank-
ing system. Some, however, invest this responsibility in other agencies or
43. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 22.
44. Id.
45. See id. art. 18.
46. The Korean, Swiss, American, and German banking laws have similar provisions;
however, Mexico, Canada, and Japan greatly restrict the activities of foreign banks. See
Wendt, The Role of Foreign Banks in International Banking, in Michael P. Malloy, The
Regulation of Banking: Cases and Materials on Depository Institutions and Their Regu-
lators 821, 821-28 (1992).
47. Countries where the central bank sets the economic norms for commercial banks
include Italy, Japan, Korea, and Venezuela. See Wendt, supra note 46, at 823-25, 829.
48. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 24; Commercial Banking Law, supra
note 4, art. 24.
49. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 24.
50. Id.
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make no provision for the supervision of commercial banks."1 The new
legislation enables the Central Bank itself to verify commercial banking
operations or to entrust this task to auditing organizations.52
The new legislation contains provisions that require the Bank of Rus-
sia to prescribe the types of materials and deadlines for submission of
accounting and statistical reports required for supervisory purposes. It
also requires the Central Bank to establish a single procedure governing
bank accounting, reporting, and business transactions. 53
The Central Bank also may issue binding instructions to banks requir-
ing them to remove violations of either Russian laws or established finan-
cial standards." The Bank of Russia may impose serious disciplinary
measures when banks: (1) fail to fulfill its orders; (2) violate established
financial standards that result in losses for banks and their clients; (3) fail
to submit reports or submit false or misleading accounting data; (4) pres-
ent year-end accounting reports that bear evidence of losses and ensuing
damage to the interests of depositors and lenders; or (5) commit other
regular infringements.55 The Central Bank may take one or more of the
following actions to remedy these situations: (1) carry out a reorganiza-
tion of the bank, including enlargement of its capital and modification of
the structure of its assets; (2) restructure the bank; (3) replace the bank's
executives; (4) impose fines on the violators; (5) increase the size of statu-
tory reserves for banks that fail to observe established financial stan-
dards; (6) appoint a provisional administration to run a bank during the
period required for its reorganization; or (7) rescind the banking license,
which is tantamount to liquidation of the bank.56
In general, this close regulation and supervision of Russian banks is
similar to the United States' banking system.5 7
51. For example, in Spain, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, see Wendt, supra note
46, at 825, 826-27, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, see Bank Restructuring in Central and
Eastern Europe: Issues and Strategies, Fin. Market Trends, Feb. 1992, at 15, 25, the
central bank or an analogous body supervises the activities of commercial banks. How-
ever, in the United Kingdom, the central bank does not formally supervise banks, and in
Hong Kong neither the central bank nor any supervision of the banking system exists at
all. See Wendt, supra note 46, at 823, 828. Hungary regulates its banking system by the
"State Banking Supervision" agency, which is subordinate to the government. See Bank
Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe" Issues and Strategies, Fin. Market Trends,
Feb. 1992, at 15, 25.
52. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 30.
53. See icL arts. 31-32; Commercial Banking Law, supra note 4, arts. 42-43. The
purpose of these provisions is purely procedural: they ensure an efficient and smooth-
running supervisory system.
54. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 33.
55. See id
56. See id
57. See Michael P. Malloy, The Regulation of Banking: Cases and Materials on De-
pository Institutions and Their Regulators 830 (1992). In the United States, "the ap-
proach has been one of relatively close oversight of the banking system, including
maintenance of public confidence and stability by the establishment of strictures on in-
dustry structure (e.g., entry, competition, products) and operations (e.g., capital ade-
quacy, lending limits, liquidity, interest rates)." Id
1993]
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C. The Central Bank's Regulation of the Monetary and Credit System
under the New Banking Laws
One of the most important functions of the Central Bank is the imple-
mentation of a single federal monetary and credit policy. The Russian
laws, similar to the laws of many other nations,58 recognize this objective
and give the Bank of Russia the legal authority necessary for implement-
ing such a policy.
Under the new banking laws, the Bank of Russia determines its mone-
tary and loan policy and defines it in the Basic Guidelines for Monetary
and Credit Regulation.59 The laws provide that "[t]he Bank of Russia
shall be the authority that regulates the monetary and lending activity of
the republic, and the volume and the structure of the money mass in
circulation."'
The new legislation provides a legal framework for the organization of
the monetary circulation in the country according to the Central Bank's
policy. The Bank of Russia shall "conduct emission and withdrawal of
money from circulation [in] the territory of [Russia]."'" In order to per-
form this function, the Central Bank has the power (1) to issue currency;
(2) to establish rules governing transportation, storage, custody, and col-
lection; (3) to set up reserve funds; and (4) to decide on the principles and
procedure for determining the validity, exchange, and destruction of
damaged paper currency.6 2 The laws also provide other necessary means
of conducting monetary policy and loan regulation. These include deter-
mining the size of the mandatory reserves and loan interest rates, pre-
scribing economic rates for banks, and effecting transactions with
securities.63
Formerly, Gosbank arbitrarily set banks' interest rates, which were
mostly used for accounting purposes. 6' Under the new legislation, the
Central Bank regulates interest rates by changing the rates for loans
made to commercial banks in order to encourage investment activities. 65
In terms of regulating the foreign aspect of the monetary and loan
system, the Bank of Russia has the power to: (1) regulate the ruble ex-
change rate with regard to foreign currencies;66 (2) license banks to con-
duct operations in hard currency in Russia and abroad; (3) impose
58. Countries where a central bank regulates the monetary and credit system include
Japan, Spain, Singapore, see Wendt, supra note 46, at 824, 826-27, and Czechoslovakia,
see C.S.FR. Central Bank Made Independent of Federal, Republic Governments, BNA,
Mar. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAIFD File.
59. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 13.
60. Id.
61. Id. art. 11.
62. See id. art. 12.
63. See id. art. 13.
64. See Jack A. Barbanel & Linda L. Maillet, Business in the Soviet Union: A Primer
and Overview 152 (1991).
65. See id.
66. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 19.
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limitations on the volume of loans attracted by banks from foreign
sources; and (4) restrict interest rates within the framework of a single
federal monetary and loan policy.67
Thus, the new banking laws recognize the paramount role of the Cen-
tral Bank as a regulator of the monetary and loan system and provide the
legal framework to carry out this function.
D. Protection of Bank Customers
The drafters of the new legislation recognized the need to sufficiently
protect customers. 68 The Bank of Russia achieves this objective by estab-
lishing statutory reserve requirements, which act as a guarantee of
commercial banks' obligations.69 The Central Bank also may create in-
surance funds for each bank to compensate customers for possible losses
attributable to the bank.7° The incomes of the appropriate banks estab-
lish these insurance funds.7 ' The laws expressly require the banks to
maintain their insurance and statutory reserves. 72
The new legislation, recognizing the importance of protecting bank
customers, introduces this goal into the Bank of Russia's powers as a
licensor of the commercial banks. The Central Bank may refuse to grant
a banking license in case of "inadequate financial standing of the foun-
ders.., which poses a threat to the interests of the bank's depositors and
creditors."7 3 The Central Bank also may withdraw a banking license
where the bank's year-end accounting report shows losses and damage to
the interests of bank customers.74
In addition to providing protection against losses, the new legislation
protects customers' legal rights. Banks have an obligation "to keep confi-
dential all information pertaining to operations, accounts and deposits of
the bank, its clients and correspondents." ' The laws provide only lim-
ited exceptions to the duty of confidentiality and authorize bank officials
to disclose information solely to courts of law and arbitration, investiga-
tory bodies, and organizations that are authorized by law to receive con-
fidential information.76 They also establish a special procedure which
must be followed when monies and other property of bank customers are
seized or levied upon.7 7
The new legislation concentrates specifically on the protection of per-
sonal deposits and provides that "depositors shall be free to choose at
67. See id art. 21.
68. See id art. 5.
69. See Commercial Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 10.
70. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 29.
71. See id
72. See Commercial Banking Law, supra note 4, art 24.
73. I art. 17.
74. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 33.
75. Commercial Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 25.
76. See id
77. See ia art. 26.
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their discretion a bank to keep their money and may have savings depos-
its at one or several banks." ' In addition, banks must provide deposi-
tors with documentary confirmation of a receipt of a deposit."9
According to the laws, "banks shall be obliged to ensure" the safety of
the money accepted from individuals and "timely fulfillment of obliga-
tions toward their depositors."8' 0
In summary, the laws have created a two-tier banking system by sepa-
rating the operations of the Central Bank from commercial bank func-
tions. The laws provide the legal foundation to support the Central
Bank's independent status. Under the new legislation, the Central Bank
has sufficient powers to regulate and supervise the commercial banks and
to ensure compliance with this legislation and other Russian laws. The
new legislation also creates a legal mechanism for regulating the mone-
tary and loan system and gives the Central Bank the power to conduct
this important function.
This new legislation also recognizes the importance of protecting the
interests of commercial bank customers and provides the legal means to
effect this protection. Thus, the new Russian banking laws appear ade-
quate, at least in theory, to create a well-regulated competitive banking
system. In the present economic and political situation in Russia, how-
ever, the new legislation does not work well in practice.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE NEW
BANKING LAWS
Even though the new banking laws are adequate in theory, major prac-
tical problems exist. These practical difficulties must be addressed and
overcome in order for Russia to build an effective banking system.
A. Independence and Accountability of the Central Bank
The new banking laws provide a legal basis for the independent status
of the Bank of Russia.8" Under the laws, the Bank of Russia is accounta-
ble to the Supreme Soviet and is independent of the executive and admin-
istrative bodies of state power.8 2 In reality, however, external pressures
influence the Central Bank's independence. Political pressure from the
executive branch and especially the President of the Republic, which col-
lectively hold the greatest amount of power in the Russian government,
often dictates the actions of the Central Bank; sometimes this pressure
even causes the Central Bank to act in direct conflict with its stated pur-
poses.8 3 For example, the new legislation seeks to stop the traditional
78. Id. art. 38.
79. See id.
80. Id. art. 39.
81. See supra notes 6-26 and accompanying text.
82. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 1.
83. See The New Central Banks in the Republics of the Former U.S.S.R., Cent. Bank-
ing, Winter 1991-92, at 12, 20 [hereinafter The New Central Banks].
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practice of financing the budget deficit through direct loans from the
Central Bank." The Bank of Russia, however, continues to finance gov-
ernment deficits.8 5 In addition, in December 1992, President Yeltsin is-
sued a decree that made the Chairman of the Bank of Russia a member
of the government.8 6 This edict directly contradicts the provisions of the
banking laws and makes the Central Bank even more susceptible to pres-
sure by the executive branch.
Influence from the executive branch is also the reason for the difficult
relations between the Central Bank and the Supreme Soviet. In Russia's
present political situation, the executive and legislative branches often
conflict, and each possesses different views on the conduct of the coun-
try's financial policy.87 Due to executive pressure, the Bank of Russia
ignores the directives of the Supreme Soviet even though it is required to
act in accordance with such decisions: "the leadership of the Bank of
Russia systematically refuses to fulfill the decisions of the... Supreme
Soviet and its Presidium. The latest example is the resolution of the Pre-
sidium of the Supreme Soviet on providing credits for shipments of goods
to regions of the Far North . ,"I" The Central Bank has ignored this
decision refusing to provide the credits.8 9
The Bank of Russia also consistently violates the procedural provi-
sions of the laws, which were to give the Supreme Soviet power to con-
trol the activities of the Bank. The laws, for example, stipulate that the
Bank of Russia shall prepare an annual report containing an analysis of
the state of the republic's financial system and a review of the Bank's
transactions, including profits and losses." The report is especially im-
portant as a way of checking the efficiency of the Bank of Russia, which
is completely exempt from taxation.91 The Central Bank, however, did
not present the 1990 report for the Supreme Soviet's confirmation.9 It
also failed to comply with the statutory requirement to publish its
84. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 1; see also supra notes 25-26 and accom-
panying text.
85. See The New Central Banks, supra note 83, at 20.
86. See Ivan Zhagel, Chairman of Russian Federation Central Bank Becomes a Mem-
ber of the Government, Current Dig. Soviet Press, Current Dig. Post-Soviet Press, Dec.
16, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CDSP File. Furthermore, on September 21,
1993, President Yeltsin issued a decree "that the central bank will stop answering to
Parliament and start answering to the President." Claudia Rosett, Obstacle to Reform:
Rooted in Soviet Pas4 Russia's Central Bank Lacks Grasp of Basics, Wall St. J., Sept. 23,
1993, at Al.
87. For example, the Supreme Soviet tries to prevent the invasion of foreign capital
into Russia, while the executive actively encourages this process. See Valeri Vizutovich,
Visa dl'a Dollara: Kto Zashitit Inostrannie Kapitali v Rossii [Visa for Dollar: Who Will
Protect Foreign Capitals in Russia], Novoye Russkoye Slovo, Dec. 22, 1992, at 5.
88. Central Bank Scoredfor Arbitrary Action, Current Dig. Soviet Press, Current Dig.
Post-Soviet Press, June 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CDSP File.
89. See id
90. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 8.
91. See id art. 9.
92. See Central Bank Scored for Arbitrary Action, supra note 88.
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monthly balance sheets.9"
The Central Bank's noncompliance with the procedural provisions of
the banking laws represents a clear unwillingness to be controlled by the
Supreme Soviet in its financial and management operations. This is so
because, as a result of the executive branch's influence, the Bank's activi-
ties may run counter to the policies of the Supreme Soviet. Thus, despite
the new legislation's establishment of an adequate legal basis for indepen-
dence and accountability of the Central Bank, the Bank is constantly
pressured by political power and far from independent. It systematically
refuses to fulfill the decisions of the Supreme Soviet and to comply with
procedural provisions of the laws, thereby destroying the Bank's ac-
countability as envisioned by the banking legislation.
B. Organization, Supervision, and Activities of Commercial Banks
The new banking legislation authorizes the Central Bank to supervise
the organization and activity of the commercial banks "with the aim of
maintaining stability of the monetary and loan system."94 Due to the
limited technology available in present-day Russia, however, the Bank of
Russia has tremendous difficulty performing this function.
The introduction of new equipment and technology has not kept pace
with either rapid developments in the banking system or the rapid
growth in the number of banks.95 Few commercial banks have comput-
erized accounts or services. 96 Often, banks display facsimile machines
and computers strictly for show. 97 Due to the lack of training, "it's not
uncommon for technical employees to while away the day muddling un-
aided through data base and spreadsheet applications, trying to get the
software to work." 98 A realistic accounting and bookkeeping system
does not exist in Russia.99 There are not enough people working in
banks because "the accountant/bookkeeper has little prestige and earns
less than half the salary of an engineer or economist. ' '"" ° Additionally,
most of the bankers have no adequate training or education: "[Russian]
93. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 8. The Central Bank systematically
violates this provision: "[t]he only time a balance sheet was published.., was in Febru-
ary 1992, after the Bank came in for serious criticism at a session of the Russian Federa-
tion Supreme Soviet." Central Bank Scored for Arbitrary Actions, supra note 88.
94. Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 22.
95. From 1987 to November 1992, the number of banks increased from only four in
the whole Soviet Union to 1,700 banks in Russia alone. See To Russia with Cash? Not
Quite Yet, Am. Banker, Nov. 23, 1992, at 8. As of August 1993, there were about 2000
commercial banks in Russia. See Russian Bankers Get a Look at Banking in the US,
Bank Letter, Aug. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Banks Library, Allbnk File.
96. See Joseph L. McCarthy, In Moscow, a Banking Revolution, Am. Banker, Nov. 8,
1991, at 2A, 8A.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See Vladimir Kvint, Moscow Learns the Language of Business, J. Acct., Nov.
1990, at 114, 117.
100. Id.
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accounting is really no more than a bookkeeping system managed by
low-level retired women and [ilnexperienced new graduates of technical
schools." 101
The effect of these problems on the practical application of the new
legislation is enormous. For example, the laws require the Bank of Rus-
sia to process applications for banking licenses.102 In practice, "there are
neither the staff nor the computers to more than rubber stamp the appli-
cations."103 The Bank of Russia is also unable to ensure that banks' stat-
utes and articles of incorporation do not contradict the laws of the
country and that the founders' financial standing does not pose a threat
to the banks' future customers as required by the laws."°  As a result,
banks violating the laws or having inadequate financial resources are
likely to receive licenses. This may damage the legitimacy of the banking
system and harm customers who stand to lose their life-savings due to
the banks' insufficient capital and improper activities.
The Central Bank also has a problem adequately supervising commer-
cial banks' activities as required by the banking laws."05 The Bank of
Russia has neither sufficient regulators to deal with the large number of
new banks nor computers and experience to process and analyze the in-
formation given to it by the banks.' 6 The same problems exist at the
commercial banking level and, as a result, the banks are unable to pro-
vide the Central Bank with the required statistics.107 Consequently, the
Bank of Russia cannot verify commercial banking operations.
The Central Bank's inability to give binding instructions to the com-
mercial banks, despite its apparent power under the new banking legisla-
tion, further complicates the situation. 08 "[Mjew people know what is
permitted and what is not because of the speed at which new decrees on
banking and currency regulation are passed."'" Moreover, the shortage
of resources and information prevents the Central Bank from knowing
whether banks have transgressed any regulations. Even if the Bank of
Russia notices violations, it cannot adequately prevent them. "Bankers
have adopted a 'Go on then, arrest me' attitude [with] the regulators." '" 0
Arrests have only occurred in cases where banks grossly violated tax or
foreign exchange laws."'
As a result of the Bank of Russia's inability to verify bank operations
101. Id at 115.
102. See Commercial Banking Law, supra note 4, arts. 15-17.
103. Simon Brady, In the Red, Euromoney, July 1991, at 19, 20.
104. See Commercial Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 17.
105. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 30; see also supra notes 43-57 and ac-
companying text.
106. See Brady, supra note 103, at 20.
107. See The New Central Banks, supra note 83, at 16.
108. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 33.
109. Brady, supra note 103, at 20.
110. Id
111. See id "One example reported in the Russian media involved a co-operative bank
trying to sell for dollars more rubles than theoretically existed in circulation." Id.
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and to issue appropriate binding instructions, the adequate supervisory
system so well framed in the banking laws does not exist in practice.
This undermines the Bank of Russia's ability to achieve the laws' goal of
maintaining stability of the monetary and loan system."12
Another important problem facing the Russian banking system is the
inability of commercial banks to determine adequately the creditworthi-
ness of their potential borrowers. While the laws allow banks to extend
credit,113 this activity is very risky in practice because of technological
limitations. Businesses have no records showing their creditworthi-
ness. 114 Due to inexperience, many new companies overestimate their
future earnings. 5 In addition, the banks have no experience in evaluat-
ing the vitality of businesses." 6 Monitoring a loan's performance, once it
is made, also becomes difficult. The combination of these factors makes
the lending activities of the commercial banks very risky. The ownership
structure of the banks increases this risk. Many non-financial businesses
set up banks in order to provide loans to themselves." 17 Thus, the poten-
tial for insider lending abuse is tremendous.
As a result of these problems, banks often lose the money they have
lent. Banking laws provide some measures that can be used against in-
solvent debtors,"' but since bankruptcy concepts are so new and vague
in Russia, it is almost impossible to sue defaulters." 9
The fact that many banks fund their loans through the interbank mar-
ket further complicates the situation. 2 Thus, "[a] collapse at one insti-
tution would rapidly spread through other banks' balance sheets-30%
of which comprise interbank loans."'' This, in turn, could cause serious
political problems because part of the banks' funds are deposits "from
Russian mattresses" or loans from Sberbank (the old state savings bank),
where most people still keep their money. 22 Citizens from former com-
mand economies do not immediately understand the concept of risk/re-
ward. 23 "IT]he equation of free markets with the loss of their life
savings could alter [the Russian people's] views of reformers. A wide-
spread banking crisis [brought about by the technical problems in a
credit system,] could be the catalyst for a crackdown."' 124
The new banking legislation creates many new banking instruments
112. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 22.
113. See Commercial Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 5.
114. See Russian Banks: Overgrown and Underfinanced, Economist, July 18-25, 1992,
at 84, 85.
115. See Barbanel & Maillet, supra note 64, at 156.
116. See id.
117. See Brady, supra note 103, at 19.
118. See Commercial Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 34.
119. See Russian Banks: Overgrown and Underfinanced, supra note 114, at 85.
120. See Brady, supra note 103, at 20.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Id.
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and activities necessary for a successful banking system. For example,
the laws introduce for the first time the use of checks and other payment
instruments for banking purposes in Russia.'25 Due to the lack of experi-
ence and equipment, however, "[t]here is only the must [sic] rudimentary
payment system in place. There are... virtually no checks, and wire
transfers take four to six weeks to complete.""'2 The laws also allow the
banks to "provide broker and consultancy services,"' 27 but, for the same
reasons, the commercial banks are unable to engage in these businesses.
Russia's technological limitations make it almost impossible to imple-
ment successfully the provisions of the new banking legislation that deal
with organization, supervision, and activities of the commercial banks.
As a result, great difficulties in achieving a successful financial system
threaten to break down Russia's whole process of reform.
C. The Independence of Commercial Banks
The new banking legislation has given commercial banks political in-
dependence from the government and working independence from the
Central Bank.128 In practice, however, neither goal has been achieved.
1. The Independence of Commercial Banks from the Political Power
of the Government
The laws proclaim the independence of commercial banks from gov-
ernmental influence when making their decisions with regard to banking
operations. To this end, the laws prohibit the use of funds from political
and state organizations in the formation of a bank's capital.'29 Many
such organizations, however, violate this law. For example, several min-
istries have formed their own banks. Menatep, which is a very active
new financial group, has been set up by members of the Young Commu-
nist League. 130 The largest Russian bank, the Rosselkhoz Bank, is the
former state agricultural bank that merely changed its name.' 3 ' In addi-
tion, four-fifths of the Russian commercial banks are owned by state-run
enterprises. 132 For example, the state company that makes Lada cars has
provided the founding capital and holds shares of the AvtoVAZ Bank,
the country's third largest bank. 33 Banks without political ties, there-
fore, are difficult to find.
In addition, many banks are run by "the old communist elites, who
125. See Commercial Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 5.
126. Donald S. Rice, A Mission to Moscow, Banking's Frontier, Am. Banker, July 29,
1992, at 4.
127. See Commercial Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 5.
128. See id. art. 8; Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 22.
129. See Commercial Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 8.
130. See Russian Banks. Overgrown and Underfinanced, supra note 114, at 84.
131. See id
132. See id
133. See id at 85.
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have found a new way to exercise power," '13 4 despite prohibitions against
employment of government and state officials in a bank's management.' 35
This occurs because the old system is not yet broken. The communists
have all the money and connections necessary to establish a bank while it
is very difficult for ordinary people to do the same. The All-Russia Ex-
change Bank, for example, has a former Soviet parliamentary spokesman
on its board and conducts its board meetings in the country house owned
by Stalin's police chief.'36
The banks, therefore, may not be able to operate commercially. Given
current practices, there is a grave danger that political interests will influ-
ence interest rates and loan decisions, thus making the declared govern-
mental independence of the banks a myth.
2. The Independence of Commercial Banks from the
Interference of the Central Bank
The laws require the Central Bank to create favorable conditions for
the stable performance of commercial banks.' 37 They also prohibit the
Bank of Russia from interfering in banks' current operations, 38 making
the banks legally independent in their day-to-day activities. This inde-
pendence, however, is often limited because of heavy dependence on
funds' 39 that the Bank of Russia loans to the banks at low interest
rates."' This dependence results from the shortage of other sources
from which banks can get cash for transactions and withdrawals on a
reliable basis.
Deposits, for example, are scarce. People prefer to keep their money
at the old state savings bank, Sberbank."' There are several reasons for
this: (1) commercial banks cannot provide their customers with the same
security guarantees as Sberbank; 142 (2) the people are used to keeping
their money with Sberbank and this tradition is very difficult to
change; 14 3 and (3) Sberbank has better office facilities and a greater abil-
134. Id. at 84.
135. See Commercial Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 8.
136. See Russian Banks: Overgrown and Underfinanced, supra note 114, at 84.
137. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
138. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 22.
139. See Sundararajan, supra note 1, at 12; see also Rosett, supra note 86, at A7
("[B]anks [that receive low interest rate loans] serve as conduits for bargain-price credit
to sectors with strong lobbies in Parliament. So, in effect, the central bank has been
playing middleman for a Parliament-driven industrial policy.").
140. See Russian Banks: Oergrown and Underfinanced, supra note 114, at 85.
141. See id. The commercial banks hold only about four percent of household depos-
its, while Sberbank holds the rest. See Sberbank; Into the Fray, Economist, May 29-June
4, 1993, at 86, 86.
142. "No government-sponsored deposit insurance system exists in Russia other than
for deposits in Sberbank, for which the state guarantees repayment of deposits on de-
mand." Melanie L. Fein, Emerging Russian Banking System is Unique; but Changes to
Law May Adopt Western Standards, Russia & Commonwealth Bus. L. Rep., Jan. 11,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l File.
143. See Kazmin, supra note 2, at 120.
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ity to advertise than the majority of the commercial banks.'" Thus, in-
sufficient household deposits prevent commercial banks from functioning
normally and fail to free them from dependence on the Central Bank.
Furthermore, because businesses do not traditionally use cash in most
of their transactions due to governmental policies, banks have also had
difficulty tapping the corporate sector for cash. "The money used by
enterprises circulates in two legally separate circuits. Enterprises hold
deposits at commercial banks. When one wants to buy something from
another, it credits the bank account of the seller and debits its own ac-
count.""14 If the enterprise needs cash, it has to get the money from an
official source. As a result, "the banking system cannot freely convert
notes and coin into bank money, and vice versa."' " Thus, the banks
cannot receive adequate cash deposits from corporate enterprises.
The only remaining source of capital is the Bank of Russia. The Bank
doubled its lending to commercial banks between June and October
1992, and more than half of the total funds used for bank lending in
October came from the Central Bank. 47 Banks have almost stopped
lending their own money to the enterprises, "instead becoming mere
channels for central-bank credit .... Far from becoming important fi-
nancial intermediaries as the economy liberalises [sic], the banks find
themselves increasingly marginal to the whole process."' 48 As a result,
even though the commercial banks are theoretically independent from
the Central Bank, they depend heavily on it for capital and cheap credit,
thereby allowing the Central Bank to regularly interfere in their
business.149
D. The Central Bank's Regulation of the Monetary and Credit System
The laws designate a single federal monetary and credit policy as one
of the most important functions of the Bank of Russia. 5 The Central
Bank must carry out this function by regulating cash and non-cash emis-
sions in the country. 51 In practice, however, "[t]he Bank of Russia is
not ensuring the reliable organization of monetary circulation and cash
services, especially the distribution of the money supply throughout the
republic, something that is provoking social outbursts in certain regions
of Russia." '152
144. See id
145. Russian Bank" Overgrown and Underfinanced, supra note 114, at 85.
146. Id
147. See Russian Banks. A Mess without a Market, Economist, Dec. 26, 1992-Jan. 8,
1993, at 107, 107.
148. Id
149. See Central Bank Scored for Arbitrary Action, supra note 88.
150. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 5; see also supra notes 58-67 and accom-
panying text.
151. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 11.
152. Central Bank Scored for Arbitrary Actions, supra note 88. For example, "[the
central] bank's June 26 decision to withdraw pre-1993 roubles to support the inflation-hit
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The laws require that the Central Bank define its monetary and loan
policy in the Basic Guidelines for Monetary and Credit Regulation,
which is to be confirmed annually by the Supreme Soviet.153 In practice,
however, the Bank of Russia violates this provision. For example, there
were no official Basic Guidelines confirmed by the Supreme Soviet either
in 1991 or in 1992.154 The Bank of Russia presented a draft of Basic
Guidelines to the Supreme Soviet's Standing Committee on the Budget,
Plans, Taxes and Prices in March 1992.'" The Committee examined the
draft, then returned it to the Bank for further work and set a two-week
deadline. As of May, 1992, however, the Bank of Russia still had not
presented the revised Basic Guidelines. 156 As a result, the Central Bank
has been free to act unilaterally toward commercial banks and their
customers. 1
5 7
Under the laws, the Central Bank regulates credit rates by changing
rates for loans it makes to commercial banks.' 5 In reality, however, the
Bank of Russia uses its interest rates not to conduct monetary and credit
policy, but as a means of making the commercial banks dependent on
it.' 59 By doing so, the Central Bank clearly violates the new banking
legislation.
E. Invasion of Foreign Ownership
The new legislation contains no restrictions on foreign ownership of
banks."6 But quite the opposite is true elsewhere. The leading Western
countries restrict the opening of foreign-owned banks. For example,
Switzerland, Brazil, and some states in the United States allow foreign
banks to open only if reciprocal rights are given by the appropriate for-
eign state. 16 1 Similarly, "[u]ntil the 1980s, Japan kept its financial mar-
ket locked, and Spain lifted the ban on banking activity by foreigners
economy caused chaos across Russia and nine other ex-Soviet states with which it shares
the rouble." Russian Banks Seek Review of Central Bank Powers, Reuters, Aug. 27, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Banks Library, Allbnk File.
153. See Central Bank Law, supra note 3, art. 13; Central Bank Scored for Arbitrary
Action, supra note 88.
154. See Central Bank Scored for Arbitrary Actions, supra note 88.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. For example, it arbitrarily increased the "interest rates on payments into
the mandatory reserves deposited in the bank of Russia-from 2% to 20%-[that] has
led to a gap at many banks between the volume of credit resources and their actual distri-
bution." Id. In addition, the Bank of Russia annually fines such banks "in the amount of
100% of the size of the gap (debit balance)." Id.
158. See Barbanel & Maillet, supra note 64, at 152.
159. See supra notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
161. See Wendt, supra note 46, at 828; Haley & Seligman, The Development ofInterna-
tional Banking by the United States, in Michael P. Malloy, The Regulation of Banking:
Cases and Materials on Depository Institutions and Their Regulators 817, 818-19 (1992).
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only in February 1992."' 162 These restrictions are justified by a belief that
retaining control over the national banking system is a key factor in pre-
serving a country's independence. 63 In Russia, the situation is further
complicated by the inability of commercial banks-which do not have
adequate personnel, equipment, or experience' '--to compete with for-
eign banks. As a result, many commercial banks may go bankrupt,
which potentially may lead to a widespread banking crisis.' 65 Thus,
opening the financial markets to foreigners risks both loss of indepen-
dence for Russia and a danger of a banking crisis.
In summary, Russia must overcome the shortage of resources, political
conflicts, violations of law, and an influx of foreign ownership before a
modem, well-regulated banking system, as envisioned by the new legisla-
tion, may emerge.
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY
THE NEW BANKING LEGISLATION
A. The Shortage of Resources
To overcome the shortage of resources, Russian commercial banks
must look to the West for assistance in establishing their operations. The
Western nations have great experience in commercial banking and could
help train Russian bankers and technical staff, assist in establishing a
computerized banking system, and provide necessary auditing services.
Some steps have already been taken in this direction. Russian and Amer-
ican lawyers formed the Soviet-American Banking Law Working Group
in July, 1991, in an attempt to resolve the current banking problems.,
Americans also participated in the Russian Banking Conference held in
Moscow in November, 1992, and presented speakers on personnel
problems, training, and marketing. 67
Western accounting firms also have begun to provide consulting and
auditing services. Dissatisfied with the obligatory state audit, the focus
of which was to ensure balanced books and establish the figures for taxa-
tion purposes, the commercial banks want Western auditors to calculate
loan/loss provisions and provide other services. 168 A Western audit, in
162. Vladimir Gurevich, Banks Ask not to be Buried Alive, Moscow News, Oct. 21,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l File.
163. See id
164. See supra notes 95-127 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
166. See Rice, supra note 126, at 4.
167. See To Russia with Cash? Not Quite Yet, supra note 95, at 8. Considerable contri-
butions toward the preparation of the conference were made by the Association of Amer-
ican Bankers, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the United States Department of the
Treasury. Approximately 150 bankers from many countries, including the United States,
Great Britain, Belgium, Switzerland, and Japan, participated in the conference. See Din
Inamov, International Conference on Banking to Open in Moscow, The Telegraph Agency
of the Soviet Union, TASS, Nov. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l File.
168. See David Robinson, Western CPAs Gain Share of Russian Audit Market,
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accordance with international accounting, helps banks administer their
activities and possibly attract foreign investors because it enhances their
credit status with Western banks.1 69
Various international and private organizations have stepped in to pro-
vide badly-needed training. 170 Although it is difficult for Russian bank-
ers to apply the knowledge gained from attending training courses
abroad-since the home environment presently is very different from the
training plae'T1-younger bankers should be able to use the experience
gained by the Western states to make a difference in their own country.
Paying for Western assistance, however, may be difficult due to the
shortage of hard currency in Russia. The solution to this funding prob-
lem may lie in financial assistance from various aid agencies and develop-
ment banks. 172  The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, for example, established special funds to help Russian
banks pay for Western assistance. 73 Additionally, Russians may be able
to barter for such services.
B. Violations of Laws
Violations of the new laws by the Central Bank and government also
have been a problem. In order to deal with this situation, the law en-
forcement system would have to be strengthened. This remains a diffi-
cult task since this system is almost non-existent in Russia. In addition,
Russia's executive branch has traditionally not been held accountable to
anyone and has violated laws with impunity. Russia must create a legal
basis for law enforcement and apply it evenhandedly notwithstanding the
political power a particular person or entity may possess.
C. Dependence on the Central Bank's Funding
In order to free commercial banks from dependence on the Central
Bank's funding, the Bank must cut its credits to commercial banks and
ensure that banks have cash sources other than itself. The Bank of Rus-
sia should remove the traditional prohibition on operating with cash 74
so that businesses are able to make cash deposits with commercial
banks. 71 In addition, Sberbank's almost complete monopoly on house-
hold deposits' 76 must be changed. Sberbank's deposits and branches
must ultimately be turned over'7 7 to Russian commercial banks, which
Thompson's Int'l Bank Acct., Nov. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Thomp-
son's Int'l Bank Acct. File.
169. See id.
170. See The New Central Banks, supra note 83, at 23.
171. See id.
172. See Robinson, supra note 168.
173. See id.
174. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
175. See Russian Banks: Overgrown and Underfinanced, supra note 114, at 85.
176. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
177. Sberbank has about 41,000 branches. See Fein, supra note 142. It held 431 bil-
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will perform the deposit-taking. 78 To increase people's trust, the com-
mercial banks have to offer customers some form of deposit insurance, as
Sberbank did.' 7 9 Although the Central Bank opposes these reforms be-
cause they will weaken its control over banking,1 0 such changes are nec-
essary in order to create an independent and efficient modem banking
system.
D. Political Conflicts
In order for the independence and accountability provisions of the
banking laws to work in practice, the government must remove political
pressure from the Bank of Russia and return the control of the Bank to
the Supreme Soviet, as envisioned by the banking legislation. This re-
mains difficult because, traditionally, the elected representatives of the
Supreme Soviet have had only nominal powers. In fact, the executives
and the President, in particular, have made all the decisions in Russia.
This tradition must end, if a democratic society in Russia is ever to
emerge.
E. Invasion of Foreign Ownership
The issue of foreign ownership invasion into Russia is also controver-
sial. Some authorities advocate imposing a one year moratorium on the
licensing of foreign banks and revoking existing licenses.'"' Russian
banks need this period to make themselves more competitive. At the
same time, domestic needs for investment during this period may be ful-
filled by "limited foreign presence through investment projects with Rus-
sian banking partners."'8 2 The revocation of licenses, however, can lead
to discrimination against Russian banks abroad'83 and a decrease in in-
vestment." 4 In addition, the absence of any competition will undermine
the quality of banking services.' 5 These reasons prompted the Central
Bank to oppose the proposed moratorium and revocation of licenses.'
8 6
lion rubles in household deposits as of July 1, 1992. See Russian Banks: Overgrown and
Underfinanced, supra note 114, at 85.
178. See Fein, supra note 142.
179. See iL
180. See Russian Banks: Overgrown and Underfinanced, supra note 114, at 85.
181. See Fein, supra note 142. In July 1993, Parliament passed a law to cancel all
previously issued foreign banking licenses by January unless the Central Bank renewed
them by January 1, 1994. See Russia's Supreme Soviet Approves Plan to Revoke Licenses
for Foreign Banks, BNA Banking Daily, Aug. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, Banks Li-
brary, Albnk File. In addition, the law would prevent branches of foreign banks from
serving Russian clients. This law must be signed by President Yeltsin before it becomes
effective. See id
182. Yuri Kotov & Alexei Nenashev, Foreign Bankers Leave Moscow, RusData Di-
aLine-BizEkon News, Nov. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l File.
183. See Fein, supra note 142.
184. See Vizutovich, supra note 87, at 5.
185. See Kotov & Nenashev, supra note 182.
186. See Fein, supra note 142.
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It did not offer any other solutions, however, and problems remain
unresolved.
CONCLUSION
In order to bring about political and economic reforms, Russia must
establish an effective, well-regulated banking system. Russia took the
first step toward this goal by introducing new banking laws in 1990. This
legislation adequately establishes, in theory, an efficient modem banking
system. It creates a two-tier banking system and provides a legal basis
for an independent central bank, whose main functions include supervis-
ing the organization and activities of commercial banks and regulating
Russia's monetary and loan system. The laws also introduce certain pro-
visions designed specially to protect the interests of the commercial
banks' customers. Despite this new banking legislation, however, practi-
cal problems such as political conflicts, the shortage of resources and
experience, the lack of funds for banks to operate with, and the unlimited
presence of foreign ownership hinder the process of political and eco-
nomic reform.
In order to overcome the problems related to Russia's political situa-
tion, the different bodies of power must resolve their conflicts. The law
enforcement system needs strengthening in order to deter the illegal ac-
tivity undermining the goals and purposes of the new legislation. More-
over, commercial banks must ask the West for help in resolving their
staff, equipment, and experience problems. Finally, the traditional cash
and credit system must change so as to enable the commercial banks to
receive funds from sources other than the Bank of Russia, thereby ensur-
ing their independent operation.
Russia must implement the proffered solutions to the problems en-
countered with the practical application of the new banking laws if it is
to achieve a banking system capable of supporting a new political and
economic system.
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